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The COVID-19 pandemic
reminds us that no country acting
alone can respond effectively to
health threats in a globalized
world. Global governance is
necessary to coordinate the glo-
bal health response. Yet, the
COVID-19 pandemic has
revealed deep fissures in global
health governance, with inter-
national organizations facing
obstacles from nationalist gov-
ernments inmanaging a common
threat. The COVID-19 pan-
demic is reframing global health
governance. Considering key
structural limitations in meeting
enormous challenges, how can
we best realize global solidarity in
an age of populist nationalism?
With the sheer scale of human,
social, and economic upheaval, we
face an imperative to strengthen
global health institutions and
governance.
In this editorial, we reflect on
the challenges that nationalism
poses in the COVID-19 re-
sponse, conceptualizing how we
could reimagine global health
governance. We begin by ex-
amining how international or-
ganizations have sought to bring
nations together in responding to
global health threats. However,
international institutions are fac-
ing increasing pressures from
nationalist governments, and we
analyze these nationalist obstacles
to global solidarity. The struc-
tural limitations of the pandemic
response are reframing the global
health governance landscape.
Given this historic opportunity to
reimagine global health gover-
nance in the age of COVID-19,
we consider the rise of new in-
stitutional structures that reflect
the realities of a divided world.
We conclude that a new gover-
nance landscape will be crucial
to strengthening global public
health—rising out of crisis to
secure a safer future.
BRINGING NATIONS
TOGETHER
The modern global health
architecture arose from the ashes
of crisis. The United Nations
(UN) was formed 75 years ago
out of the ruins of World War II,
bringing nations together to ad-
dress collective threats through
international action. Signed on
June 26, 1945, the UN Charter
called for the establishment of a
new international health orga-
nization, the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO), which has
evolved over the years to build a
healthier world.1 TheUN system
strives toward a cosmopolitan
vision of a global community that
provides a foundation for inter-
national cooperation to advance
global health.2 The COVID-19
pandemic has challenged this
international system as never
before.
WHO is at the forefront of the
global response to health threats,
as it seeks to direct and coordinate
international action to realize the
highest attainable standard of
health. The 1946 WHO consti-
tution empowers WHO to ne-
gotiate international agreements
on a wide range of health issues.
The International Health Reg-
ulations (IHR) is the primary
WHO instrument governing
pandemic threats, codifying na-
tional obligations “to prevent,
protect against, control and
provide a public health response
to the international spread of
disease.”3(art. 2) Last revised in
2005 following concerns over the
global response to SARS (severe
acute respiratory syndrome), the
IHR provides a framework to
build national health system ca-
pacities and strengthen WHO
authority to respond to public
health emergencies of interna-
tional concern.
WHO has long sought to
strengthen its institutional au-
thority to coordinate national
health efforts, with the WHO
director general calling for “col-
laboration and partnership”
through a strengthened WHO.4
Now facing its greatest pandemic
challenge, WHO is seeking to
galvanize “global solidarity” in
the COVID-19 response.5 Call-
ing for solidarity across nations
to facilitate equity in the global
response, WHO has supported
national strategies to prepare for,
rapidly detect, and respond to
COVID-19 by providing tech-
nical information, coordinating
health research, and raising emer-
gency funds.
Complementing WHO, the
larger UN system has established
global health initiatives for in-
ternational health cooperation.
UN action on global health has
increased dramatically over the
past two decades. The UN
General Assembly has devoted
high-level special sessions to
both infectious disease and non-
communicable disease, with re-
cent action on antimicrobial
resistance and universal health
coverage.6 The UN Security
Council has weighed in on health
emergencies, elevating the po-
litical response to health security
threats, beginning in response to
the HIV/AIDS pandemic and
extending through recent Ebola
epidemics.7
In responding to the global
threat ofCOVID-19, theUNhas
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developed a COVID response
plan, a humanitarian response
plan, and a framework tomitigate
social and economic impacts.8
Recognizing the economic
consequences of earlier Ebola
outbreaks in sub-Saharan Africa,
the UN is striving to minimize
the effects of the current pan-
demic on lives, livelihoods, and
the economy and to build a more
inclusive and sustainable future.
To help nations remain resil-
ient under this socioeconomic
framework, the UN secretary
general launched the United
Nations COVID-19 Response
and Recovery Fund to aid low-
and middle-income countries in
the pandemic response.
Yet even as the UN system
seeks to bring the world together,
governments have too often
responded alone, as the universal
system of international organiza-
tions has faced continuing obsta-
cles in realizing global solidarity.
OBSTACLES TO
GLOBAL SOLIDARITY
Contrasted with the cosmo-
politan vision of global solidarity
through international organiza-
tions, nationalist governments
have subverted global health
governance in the COVID-19
response. Nationalist leaders have
weakened WHO’s authority,
blocked a coordinated UN re-
sponse, and imposed isolationist
policies that divide the world.
These challenges to international
law and institutions have esca-
lated the pandemic threat.
WHO’s global health man-
date has been challenged by the
rising reluctance of national
governments to adequately sup-
port global health governance.
This is seen most clearly in
member state attacks on WHO’s
leadership and refusal to meet
national financial obligations to
WHO’s programming in the
pandemic response—with the
United States, WHO’s largest
donor, seeking to withdraw from
WHO entirely.9 Beyond explicit
attacks, nationalist governments
have also weakened global gov-
ernance through violations of
IHR obligations, including fail-
ures to share timely and accurate
information with WHO and
failures to act on WHO’s warn-
ings and recommendations. The
IHR aims to harmonize national
health responses while facilitat-
ing international coordination,
yet governments have failed to
comply with IHR obligations,
prioritizing political ideology
over epidemiologic reality.10
TheUN system similarly relies
on international cooperation,
but ongoing political conflicts
have paralyzed the UN, pre-
venting it from leading a coor-
dinated global response.11
Limiting its influence in global
health governance, the UN Se-
curity Council has been hobbled
by conflicts between the United
States andChina about the origins
of the pandemic and the adequacy
of the early response. As a result,
the Security Council struggled for
six months to adopt its first reso-
lution on COVID-19—backing
the secretary general’s repeated
call for a ceasefire in armed
conflict to aid in addressing the
pandemic in humanitarian set-
tings. Despite continuing support
among many nations for multi-
lateral governance, permanent
members of the Security Council
have employed power politics to





policies that undermine global
solidarity. As governments rap-
idly imposed international travel
bans, many nations engaged in
medical protectionism that im-
peded the movement of health
supplies in the early months of
the pandemic—restricting ex-
ports of personal protective
equipment, other medical sup-
plies, and even necessary food
supplies.12 The United States
purchased virtually the entire
global supply of remdesivir, an
early COVID-19 treatment,
presaging future obstacles to the
equitable distribution of other
drugs and vaccines.13 These
nationalist policies have trans-
gressed international law, with
cascading effects on international
trade, health determinants, and
human rights.14 Rather than
working together to fight a
common threat, nationalist
strategies pit nations against na-
tions, subvert global action to
curb the pandemic, and grind the
world to a standstill.
Nationalist challenges in the
COVID-19 response highlight
key structural obstacles that
weaken global health gover-
nance. How can global gover-
nance respond effectively when
nations place WHO in the
middle of political power strug-
gles, paralyze the UN in a fit
of political theater, and isolate
themselves in a globalizing world?
Amid the struggle between
nationalist and cosmopolitan
worldviews, global health gover-
nance must be reimagined to ac-
commodate both nationalism and
globalism. Responding to the
limitations inherent in the current
system, COVID-19 offers an





The global devastation of
COVID-19 highlights the critical
need to reform the global health
system. Pathogens threaten an
interconnected world, yet the
UN system has proven inade-
quate to meet pandemic threats
and unable to realize global sol-
idarity. Global health governance
through international organiza-
tions remains essential—WHO
and UN leadership are needed,
now more than ever—but it
is crucial to recognize what is
painfully obvious: nationalism is
impeding international coopera-
tion. International organizations
with universal membership are
only effective if their member
states are willing to cooperate.15
What does it mean to strengthen
global governance in the face
of resurgent nationalism? In this
fragmented world, we have to
reimagine global health institu-
tions, conceptualizing the global
health governance landscape
with a diminished US presence, a
fractured global health ecosys-
tem, and a changing WHO role.
A Diminished United
States
The United States has long
stood at the forefront of global
health. Beginning in 1902 with
the creation of the first perma-
nent international health orga-
nization in the Americas, the
United States has led the way in
establishing global health gover-
nance. The United States hosted
the International Health Con-
ference that adopted the WHO
constitution, holding preeminent
influence over WHO’s pro-
gramming in its early years.
Continuing to shape the global
health agenda through bilateral
and multilateral engagement, the
United States has remained the
single largest funder of global
health initiatives through its sig-
nature global health programs,
including the PEPFAR (Presi-
dent’s Emergency Program for
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AIDS Relief) and the Global
Health Security Agenda. The
United States has provided crit-
ical support for global health
partnerships, including the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria and
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.16
Yet, amid nationalist shifts, the
US government has abdicated
responsibility for global health
and pulled back from global
governance. In deflecting from
his own domestic policy failures
in the COVID-19 response, the
populist US president has esca-
lated attacks on WHO’s leader-
ship and sought to withdraw
from WHO completely. He has
paralyzed UN efforts through
political attacks on China while
threatening the world through
efforts to hoard COVID-19
treatments and prospective vac-
cines. As a result, US global in-
fluence has been weakened.
These divisive actions have pre-
sented the United States as an
untrustworthy partner in a global
crisis and could lead to a per-
manent diminishment of US
legitimacy in global health.
Without US support, global
efforts will face limitations.
Cutting WHO funding,
obstructing the UN, and
eschewing collective action
during a pandemic will hamper
the global response. However, as
other countries step forward to
support the global response and
seek a larger influence in global
health,17 global health gover-
nance will endure—but it will
do so without the influence that
the United States once wielded.
Global institutions may become
more responsive to a far larger set
of actors and, as a consequence,
could shift to focus on global
health initiatives that do not align
with US national interests.
Although US global health
engagement has often benefitted
the world, there are also times
when the United States has sha-
ped the international agenda
to prioritize its own domestic
economic interests over global
public health. Without US
corporate interests at the table,
US disengagement could allow
global institutions to take a more
flexible approach to intellectual
property rights to promote access
to medicines and focus more
on preventing and controlling
noncommunicable diseases
driven by commercial determi-
nants of health, including alco-
holic beverages, sugar-sweetened
beverages, tobacco, and un-
healthy foods. WHO has long
understood that “efforts to pre-
vent non-communicable dis-
eases go against the business
interests of powerful economic
operators.”18(p895) The absence
of US influence could pres-
ent new opportunities to regu-
late commercial interests that
harm health through new poli-





were once at the center of the
global health landscape, but the
modern era has seen the rise of a
far more expansive ecosystem
that adds complexity to global
health governance. Distinct
spheres of influence have
emerged in the current pan-
demic. These factions have led to
divergent COVID-19 responses,
with the United States adopting
an isolationist posture, China
shoring up its alliances and
expanding its influence, and
the European Union vigorously
defending the multilateral
system. This shift away from
coordinated global health gov-
ernance has led to political con-




relations, global health gover-
nance increasingly brings to-
gether state actors with a






the legitimacy of international
organizations, these new part-
nerships have come together in
club models of voluntary partic-
ipation and financing.20 Gover-
nance has thus shifted over several
decades—away from the uni-
versal system of international
organizations and toward these
nonuniversal partnerships that
undertake discrete global health
initiatives.
Such a fractured ecosystem is
not fit for the purpose of an ef-
fective global pandemic response.
A core challenge has been that
these new global health part-
nerships were designed for de-
velopment assistance; they were
never intended to be truly uni-
versal global initiatives. That is,
the global health ecosystem is
designed to neither receive ro-
bust support from nor meet the
needs of all countries.
This dilemma is seen in the
COVAX facility, jointly led by
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance,
WHO, and the Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness Innova-
tions. Gavi has long received
voluntary contributions from
select state and nonstate actors to
ensure access to vaccines in the
world’s poorest countries, but
it now faces challenges in the
COVID-19 response. High-
income countries have already
spent heavily to secure commit-
ments to early COVID-19 vac-
cine candidates for their domestic
needs, with this “vaccine nation-
alism” leaving only an inequitable
fraction of the global supply
available to COVAX for the
large number of countries that
will depend on it for access.21
The competitive scramble for
vaccines highlights both the
fragmented geopolitical land-
scape and the challenges that
development-oriented global
health partnerships face in
addressing a threat facing all
countries, necessitating a
changing role for WHO in




States established WHO as a
universal multilateral institution
to coordinate intergovernmental
actions in international health. In
contrast with other global health
actors, WHO’s mandate has al-
ways been to serve the interests
of all nations across all health
challenges. Although much of
WHO’s programming has fo-
cused on developing countries—
with this tropical medicine mindset
at times criticized for neocolonial
infringement on the sovereignty
of recipient governments—
WHO’s governance has pro-
vided a political forum for all
states to come together to debate
issues, negotiate norms, and re-
solve differences in guiding
global health policy.22
Yet even as the end of the
Cold War provided an oppor-
tunity for all nations to join to-
gether in the early 1990s under
WHO, high-income countries
rapidly moved to establish health
assistance programs outside
WHO—through increased bi-
lateral health assistance, pub-
lic–private partnerships, and
short-term commitments.23
WHO has continued to provide
key technical and normative
standards for public health;
however, states have actively
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limited WHO’s autonomy by
earmarking funding for specific
programs in conformity with
their own national priorities.24
With the resurgence of populist
nationalism, even this limited
authority is being challenged, as
national leaders have accused
WHO of favoring China in the
COVID-19 response, questioned
its public health guidance, and
threatened to withdraw from
WHO completely.
WHO’s central role remains
absolutely essential, but WHO
lacks both the authority and the
resources to mount an effective
response to a global emergency
that affects all countries. In
leading a universal response
across all nations, WHO is
seeking to support low- and
middle-income countries (which
rely more on its technical guid-
ance and operational assistance)
while simultaneously meeting
the needs of high-income
countries (which depend more
on its information sharing, re-
search coordination, and con-
vening authorities). WHO
now seeks an expanded and
strengthened role—providing
political leadership, negotiating
international disputes, and coor-
dinating technical and normative
guidance in the pandemic re-
sponse. Bringing together state
and nonstate actors, WHO has
sought to coordinate collabora-
tive COVID-19 research, as seen
in the SOLIDARITY thera-
peutics trials and serology studies,
which seek to align research
throughout the world around
a unified goal, core study pro-
tocols, and a results-sharing
platform.25
WHO’s evolving governance
could offer a new model for
global collaboration, bringing
together willing state and non-
state actors to respond to a
common threat to humanity.
The future global health
architecture may resemble mul-
tipolar clubs, rather than uni-
versal approaches to governance,
but there remains a central role
for WHO. Governments will-
ing to share their sovereignty
through multilateral arrange-
ments would be able to craft a
more robust global system. Even
if not all states engage with this
new system, those that do will be
able to ensure more effective
global governance in responding
to pandemics alongside nonstate
actors. For WHO to achieve this
goal, it will need a critical mass of
member states to provide sus-
tainable funding commensurate
with WHO’s global mandate,
powers to secure greater com-
pliance with the IHR and other
core norms, and political backing
to stand up to governments that
undermine international institu-
tions and the rule of law.
CONCLUSIONS
The world is facing an un-
precedented global health threat,
and the response is highlighting
structural limitations in the ability
of international organizations
to coordinate nationalist states.
Global health governance is at
a crossroads, necessitating a new
governance model that takes into
account the cosmopolitan ideal
of international organizations
with universal membership and
the realist landscape of populist
nationalism among member
states. It is crucial to develop a
global health governance system
that reflects the challenges of a
fragmented yet interdependent
world. The global governance
institutions that develop in the
aftermath of the COVID-19
crisis will determine the response
to future threats.
The world faces a clear choice:
either take a “my country first”
nationalist approach or work
cooperatively through shared
governance.Taking the latter path
will require reimagining global
health governance. Failure to
strengthen global governance at
this critical juncture could lead to
permanent nationalist retrench-
ment and international organi-
zation collapse, dimming hopes
for the future.
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